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Education, Freedom and Temporality 
SUNINNYUN 
Institute of Education, U nive日ityof London, UK 
Since it w.市 firstpubilshed in 2011, '.4 M.仰虫色・stofar Education＇肉yGert Biesta and Karl 
A，的 sSifitr，附 b前日出町d抑制山1senthus.印tic削 ie.附 andbeen hailed山 providing
'an alternative vision斤reducation .’ Thおpaper・attempts印叩lorewhat the authoi＇.』Pφto
山 theironic附 geof this genre of writing in relation畑山message.The仰 tho口diagnosea 
probんm in education rel叫ed白あhemod.削 nndmtandmgof time, and they suggest an 
alternative 1wn-temporality’in which we Stay in幼gtension be削ノten'what is”and“what 
is not"' While I appreciate the Manifestos a品emptto ofer criticism based on the link 
be.加削戸地mand temporality in education, I take isue山 ＇tha乎帥ofth昨 a＇岬肌 In
r配dingof Martin Heidegge.九Idisc1仙 temporalityand freedom in which the concept of time 
in education is 開 derstoodm的msof human Ji町domas possibi均 Furtherdi町附則non
j子・eedomis made in ten出 ofnothingn即 inHeidegger and theめりtoSchool WiォhI宅街C町 C
印 dbnψmalysis of the Chinese character, mu, I attempt印 oferan account of Ji町domin 
relatin with nothingn町f
Since published in 2011, A M刷所，tofar Education by Gert B悶阻 andKarl Anders Sa品凶m
(herea仕errhe Manifesto) has received numerous I田ponsesin various European counrries and more. 
It has been translated in many languages. Many teachers unions’have shown their enthusiasm for 
the Manifesto by republishing it in their journals and newslettets. The pa日ionateresponse perhaps 
can be explained as due to m抗temptto articulate ‘an alternative visionゐreducation from within 
the field, rather than of education from an external economic or neoliberal perspective’（Editors’ 
no民 2012,p. 667) The affirmation of speaki吋 Jらreducation in the Manifesto is perhaps a valuable 
r白山田nceto cur町田 movemen日 m educatton which seek soluttons outstde of education. 
Meanwlule, on the contrary, education has too often been conceived m日rmsof回ng1bleor 
material m抗日目
Such enthusiasm however is perhaps not pu回lyattributable to the substance of the町田 bur
also to the form t adopts. The authors present these ideas through what must count as a rather 
unconventional educational research format or genre a manifesto. Ir is through the Manifesto that 
they intend to 'stand up for education' They do this with a degree of irony, conscious that what 
they want to convey is not somethmg that ts readily amenable to explicit五ormulation.
Manifesto is a powerful gen悶 todeclare views on polmcal or art1st1c matters，回peciallyviews of 
a bold and visionary kind. In a sense, then, they have marked our new ground in educational 
research by exploiting this materialゐrmIt fuses the descriptive and the prescrip口ve,always a 
sensitive disjuncnonゐreducational research As Biesra puts it, however, nowadays‘a manifesto can 
only be performed in an ironic manner’since: 
We know al ton well, a丘eral, that no m叩 ifestothat has ever been written-be it in the 
domam of ar or in the domain of politic「一hasever managed to change the world As 
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an ironic form or as叩 iro11cperformance-a manifとstocan be nothing more than an 
attempt to speak and, through this, create an opening, a moment of interruprion That is 
precisely what this manifesto mes to do and what M 匂 todo m出血1smanifesto We 
try to speak, not simply about education, but also for education. (M p 542) 1 
Does the acknowledgement of irony here enable the claim in the Mani長sto?Questioning the 
use of the genre, however, is not the sole project of my own paper. Their sugg回目onthat we should 
‘stay in the tension’is based on the diagnosis of a current problem in education that is tied to the 
modern unders即 idingof time. I appreciate m口山口smba<ed on the lmk berween freedom and 
日mporaliryin education They sugg田Ean alternative of no1トtempo四liry,in which one s阻ys1 the 
tension at the pr田entI shal mainly discuss出eManifesto旧日rmsof日mporalityand freedom 
through a reading of M訂mHeidegger. I shal argue for the concept of time in education in terms 
of human freedom as possibz占ザ
l.V¥弓NAMANIFESTO? AN IRONIC GENRE FOR FREEDOM 
In this rather unconventional education research format, the selected genre delivers the message 
that we should 'stand up for education'. Hence, it seeks to convey an opinion or g田tureto the 
public in a suitable form and in a way that wil have impact. How does theらrmrelate to the 
con日nt?This is a question I shal shortly invesngate. 
The Mani長：sroas aゐrmtypically provides a very short text, concisely expressed, 1 order to 
deliver a memge clearly and effectively Although such clear and印 nc即日間 may be e俗ctivein 
delivering their message, they forfeit in the proce田 theopportunity for mo問 developedand more 
lucid discusS1011. I should con長田 that,although I was fascinated by the text, almost as if I was 
kidnapped by It, I fo山idmyself looking for more precise discu田ionOne such discussion that is 
needed in particular is on temporaliry, and I return to this in the next secuon of my paper. 
Another characteristic of the genreぉthatit offer百 aclear v1s101 or a message, especially 
regarding a pr白singmatter or an urgent need. ‘5日ndingup for educanon’1s rhe motto of the 
Manifesto, and this fits the genre A manifesto’s motto can function as an exemplary陀Ference五or
what matters Guid田 tohow to wri日 apersonal manifesto, which one can easily find on Google, 
st間部出IS：‘Don’twaste yout nme on thmgs that don’t serve your manife."o. Stay focused on 
what you want.'2 The genre 1tself functions to deliver a visionary image. This is the very nature of 
the genre, a genre that is plainly prescriptive. 
With this in mind, let us briefly recal what the Manifesto says‘The authors analyse two kinds 
of currenr criticism on education 'for not delivering what it is supposed to deliver' that they put the 
口山口smsin two terms・ populism and idealism. The former, which they connect with‘what is', 
rakes education as of individual tastes of instrumental choices in the proc田sof an adaptation to 
口istingsocie「加 is,a kind of socialisation. The later, which向 h吋 w江hidealism of 
var旧uskinds, e.g. democracy, justice, solidarity, presents educanon as a utopian dream, that they 
cal 'what is noピ（M.p. 540) Their argument is that, with either orien臼non,education fails to 
take a proper responsibility for the present To tie education to 
either be adaptation to the 'wh訂正 ofsociety, in which case education becomes 
socialisation, or it can be adaptation to the‘what is’of the individual child or student, 
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thus starting from such‘facts’In bo出 cas白 educationloses its mter田tin freedom, it 
loses its in日restin an‘excess' that announc田 somethingnew and unゐreseen.(M p 
541) 
To tie education to 'what IS not', on the other hand, cannot be a solution since: 
If we go there, we tie up education with utopian dreams To keep education away from 
pure utopia is not a question of pessimism but ra出era m紅白rof not saddlmg education 
wrth unattamable hopes that defer freedom阻therth叩 makingit possible in the here 
being responsibleゐrthe pr自由lt.(M. p. 541) 
The authors’criticism is of the 日mporalityoriented, prescriptive conceptualisaロonof 
education m which what mattersゐreducat10n 仕・eedom becomes illus1onaty. They suggest, 
instead, that by re阻iningthe tension between what is and what isnot, by living in this tens旧n,
freedom in education can be properly conceived. Thus: 
To stay in the tension betweenιwhat is’and ιwhat is noピisthereゐrealso a matter of 
being responsibleゐrthe present . From an educational perspecnve, both extrem田
appear as irresponsilコleWe therefore need to stay in the tension. (M. p. 541) 
This sugg田口onis neither for the future norゐrthe fixed present. To stay in the tension is to 
consider freedom in education for here and now. In both what is and what is not, education has 
been conceived as a linear proce日 ofgrowth and learmng, and this ofren serves to divide the 
present from the future-as，ゐrexample, where the mature and the immature a問 differentiated.It 
is true that in many contexts educational goals have endlessly been postponed, with the present 
relegated to the secondary status of the‘not yeピorincomplete The Manifesto attempts to bring 
freedom back mto the educational present, 'the educational moment', and this is figured as 
r田ponS1b1!ityゐrthe present. Their argument thus heads towards the suggesnon：ιCould It be, 
therefore, that we need to take temporaliry out of education in order to captu回 something
educationally, something that is neither about what is, nor about what is not yet (but will come 
one day)?' (M. p. 543) 
Putting aside the problem of non-temporal1ty, which I shall consider shortly, I find an 
apparent contrad1cnon between the substance of the message and the form of the Manifesto. The 
genre already functions as something pr田criptiveand exemplary, in the name of something that 
has not yet appea阻止aproper educational moment, according to the authors, has been neglected 
in both extremes of what IS叩 dwhat is not; we should consider the educational moment; in this 
way we might properly conSider freedom m education. Wrthm this structure, along wrth the use of 
the genre，出eManifes凹 becomesp悶 cnpt1veand exemplary with the cntICISm of the current 
education problems. Then, would it not be ascribed to one of ‘what is not'? In this logic, freedom 
of the authors’kind would hardly be remote from one of the ideal kinds of仕出dom
The M叩 1festoIS an mterestmg polemic agamst the common unders阻ndingof time and 
freedom in education. As soon as rt appears m the form of a mamfesto, however, their suggestion 
cannot be exemp白dfrom one of their criticisms The message cl副msto reject both what is and 
、内町isnot, but the leading suggestion they make fals into what isnot. Commitment to 'what is 
not’is inherent m their use of the genre, a mamfesto The Manifesto chooses the prescriptive genre 
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to Cntl口seor overcome rhe p回scriptivenature of education as it appears in what is and what is not, 
and the irony of this seems to go beyond the irony they intend. But let us examine thJS品目her
Irony in the adoption of the form of the manifesto IS not unprecedented. Kathleen M. 
Jamieson (1975) giv白 theexample of the contradiction between content andゐrmwhen the 
Founding Fathe四 delibera悶lychoose monarchical forms while disavowing monarchy (p. 414). But 
thJS does not lessen the r田ponsibihtyof the person who adopts the genre The authors of the 
Manifesto imply a kind of necessity about their adoption of the genre they want回 speakoutside 
the received language of the academy (the language of psychology or sociology，日orexample) and 111 
a form that wil recogrnsably speak jらreducation. As Biesta puts this, the ironic form of the 
Manifesto is no more than a way to speakゐreducation (M. p. 542) But, as Varz and Rabin put it, 
this is becauseιthe rhetor 1s personally responsible for his rhetoric regardless of“genre.1”（quoted in 
Jami田on)Likewise, the irony of the genre in the Manifesto should be les the su切ectof our 
concern that then naru問。fi日claims.
The irony, however, 1s not iust to do with use of the genre: it h羽田 dowith the nature of 
fたedomitself. The仕・eedomadvocated in the Manifesto is posited in the realm of non悶mporaliry,
and this needs a lengthy discussion Biesta concedes that‘as the manif<とsrois only a short text, 
much is left unspoken and unexplored', especially regarding the details of what It would mean to 
tal・日 temporahtyout of education. (Bies回， 2012,p. 2) Bur this is irornc in my view because the 




The Manifesto posi日 theproblem of education and freedom in the domam of the 
understandmg of time. In this part, I shal discuss the nature of丘町domand日mporalityadvanced 
in the Manifesto, based on B1esra’s keynote paper at the Philosophy of Education Society of Great 
Bri凶nAnnual Conference m Oxゐrdin 2012 In that paper B1回国 accus口 themodern 
understanding of time of excluding丘町domfrom education Yet freedom, Bi回目contends,is a key 
conceptゐreducation, which he emphasises with such expr白隠ionsas‘what matters educationally in 
education’and ιwhat makes education educational'. And here again he warns that if education is 
tied either toιwhat is’or‘what is not’in this modern temporal logic m education, then freedom 
‘runs the nsk of disappeanng仕omthe scene’（2012, p. 6) 
Non-temporality is印町田日dby B1回目throughthe comparison of the modern日mporaliryof 
education To do so, Bies阻 identifiesa distinction between what is not and what is not yet. The 
dJSnnction is in fact crucial for the argument. What is not yet refers to what is to arnve m the 
future. 3 The idea of‘not yet' relegates the present to the secondary status of the mcomplete whilst 
the predet巴rminedfuture is placed m pnority. Education，旧 themeantime, no longer focuses on 
the present but lurks m wait of the illusory ideal of the fu問問 W1thoutyet, thus, here and now，尉
he pt山 non-temporalbecomes a matter in the tension between the開 o:what 1s and what 1s not 
This is, however, hardly convincing since the suggestion is stil attached to the business of what 
is not Freedom of this kind is understood in terms of a lack in current educational prarnce and 
experience. Freedom is then understood m relation to what is not Moreover, the idea of takmg‘yet’ 
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out of what is not yet is drawn丘omthe structm田 ofmodern日mporality,and this does not at al 
make ir non-temporal bur rather invokes a non-modern remporality. As Bi町田alsoputs this, the 
target here rs‘the temporal logic of modern educat10n.' （町田四，2012, p 6) But if this is so, a bet田r
exp町田101for ‘taking日mporalityout of education' might be ‘taking modern temporality out of 
education'. 
In fact, a sense of the modern temporality of freedom is hmted at in rhe Manifesto. The 
authors’interest in freedom appea四国 thefreedom of the child. The nature of such freedom is 
d1stmgu1shed仕omother typ田 offreedom出 thus:
Freedom is not license. It rs neither about 'anything goes’nor about individual 
preference and choice Freedom 1s re!attonal and therefore inherently difficult This is 
why educational仕・eedomis not about the absence of authority but about authority that 
carnes an onentatwn towards freedom with It. (M. pp. 540日541,italic, mine) 
The仕eedomthat the Ma111fesro considers is not about individual autonomy Such freedom is 
日1ectedm the Manifesto since it inherently bears the structure of freedom conceived in terms of 
modern temporality, which places the present of being in relation to the ‘not yet'. But one problem 
he悶 isthat the authors also use temporal日rmsto describe仕eedom,such田‘anorientation 
祖国町ds'.
The preposition‘towards’implies dis四nceand direction. If my pend were here with me, I 
would not make a move toward the place where I placed it befo問 Orientationimplies a sense of 
direction. Likewise, 1f something is‘towards freedom', then freedom is assumed to be detached 
from it. This seems no di除rentso far丘omthe terms of modern temporality. This expression 
already exhibits the temporal proclivity of freedom. In other words, in the absence of a temporal 
strucru回 ofeducation, the authors' suggestion of freedom would hardly be conceivable 4 And if ir 
was nor meant as a rejection of temporality itself, then it naturally cals for an al日rnativeconcept of 
担mporality,that I think one of the fruits of the Manifesto, which 1s to gene目白mo四 d1scuss10ns
jもpeducation. 
I do ag陀ewith the criticism of the modern日mporallogic of education Besid田，toponder the 
印田町uctionof this kind of refinement of expr白sionmay seem to be a rather 'academic' matter 
and not productive Bur there 1s more at stal白血ana mere qu回目onof expr田sion.If we回！日
seriously the problem of modern temporality, discussion needs to focus on the possibility of an 
a!tern叩veunderstanding of temporahty. It seems unlikely that we shal find this in the structur目
of non-temporaliry, because the emph部1sof norトtemporalityis on the present, here and no凹 By
emphasising the pr白ent,non田mporalitycontinuously loses its real sense of time since the pr田enr
is not separable 1 this way. Indeed the tendency to emphasise this spe口白csense of time seems not 
remote仕omthe problem of modern temporality itself The r田Eof the paper 1s devoted to an 
alternative conception of time in relation to education, and I shal approach this in the light of the 
work of Martin Heideg耳目
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3. THE PROBLEM OF THE PRESENT AND FREEDOM AS POSSIBILITY 
Bi回目（2012）ゐcuseson how education could work without time It is acknowledged that the 
idea that time might be四kenout of education may sound implausible, but he tri田 tobe more 
specr自c:
Because education seems to be so fundamentally caught up with a particular notion of 
日mpo悶liry-notonly at the level of ideas but also at the level of the whole educanonal 
infrastructures -the sugg田tionto回ketime out of the educational equation may be 
quite counter-intuitive. (Biesta, 2012, p. 6) 
Taking this risk, Bi回目 remindsus that the whole projecr is concerned wrth freedom. (rbrd.) 
Education and freedom are also linked in the Manifesto：‘to stand up for education’means‘to 
S阻ndup for the possibility of freedom. ’（M. p. 542) It implies that the possibility of freedom is 
close to the e田口1ceof educanon rself. The question rs how they are related to each other. 
Let us, albeit briefly, try to get closer to Bies阻＇srdeas on how education, in日rmsof 
subjectification and freedom, would work without time. Subjectification indicates one’s subject as a 
speaking subject based on the仕・eedomto speak. The speaking subject is not to be understood 
primarily in linguistic terms, to do with the proc田sof learning a language, as commonly 
understood To speal巳needsto be understood in relation回 theexperience of being addressed To 
be addr回sedrs a matrer of recop出'ingthat the orher rs addre≪rng me A speaking subject ma企esa 
ch01ce that must be understood in terms of freedom, and thrs rs a mat日rof responsibrlrty. (Br回国，
2012, p. 9) 
In the light of this Bi回目 advocatesan education conducive to subjectification without time 
Such subjecti自cationappears here and now via being addressed and taking r田ponsibilityHowever, 
has his claim, without time, actually escaped from modern temporality? Heidegger would say，出The
present' ['die Gegenwarピlh田 apeculiar ambig山ty."(CT. p. 63) For the present refe四 boththe 
P陀sentplace and the present ime, i.e here and now. 
The mo町 weemphasise the importance of the p町sent,the more we get involved in the 
business of modern temporality in education For such vocabulary is already and inherently 
embedded in the grammar of a traditional understanding of time In the same way, the idea of 
being without time, the approach of Bi町田andSa品目・om,in fact echoes the rdea of being with time. 
By contrast the emphasis should be on the nature of time I日elf.
Furthermore, the qu田口onmust be how trme and education are related to each other, for 
without this the drscussion will inevitably fal back into the discourse of ‘what is not' Que.1tions 
should first be asked about the meaning of po日ibility，岳・eedom,temporality and their relation to 
education. In this very question, we may get an approach to the first question, about time. 
In the first place, po田ibilityis an elusive concept. It tends to be understood as something not 
yet actualised. Possibility, however, is neither a complemen回ryset in parallel to actuality nor a 
string of even白血atare not yet actualised but may旧出eend appear. Let me describe myself，ゐr
instance. I am quitting smoking 紅白emoment. This expre回目thatI used to smoke and I will be a 
non-smoker The statement also addresses both fac日 thatI am a non smoker as well as I am not a 
non-smoker at the same time. I am not yet a non smoker, since I stil carry the stain of the habit 
enough to say that I am quitting smoking If I had never been a smoker, the question would not 
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even come up-at le邸t,not in the same way. However, I do not at the moment actually smoke. I 
can thus perhaps claim that I am a non-smoker but not in the same ways as those non-smokers out 
there who are freaked out when they discover someone smokmg in a public space. In this tespect, 
my credentials田 anon-smoker四mamw1thm the poss1b1lity of becommg. In this example, 
possibility 1s not a mattet of wa1tmg for the arnval of an actuality but an田pectof my being that 
encomp田S田 myac印alityThe smoking example appli町田 me,but this genetal point about 
possibility appli白 toal human beings I think we cannot imagine an animal existing in this 
condition, but this is the human condition. 
The smoking example serves to show that po田1b1htyexists beyond actuality. However, 
possibility is not a matter of any capacity or decision but a dimension of my existence. Possibility, 
for Heidegger, indicates the mode of the world in which I am. Heidegget’s most celebrated idea is 
perhaps being-in-the-wor似 Anattribu日 ofbeing-in-the-world 1s, in fact, understanding the world. 
In unders回ndingthere is opened up the possibility of things田 muchas of my own being. Such 
unders回ndingappears through prりecting:‘Iunders阻ndthe world' indicates 'I exist in the world as 
projectmg.’En抑 uif,the Germanゐr'projection’， brings to l砂Eetymologically the sense of 
throwmg something off or throwing something forward, in the sense of 'd目ignmgor sketchmg 
some project which is to be carried throughぺ（BT‘p 185) This projecting is throwing my being 
towards my possibility. In projecting, as Heidegger explains, D田町n田‘beyonditself ［“uber sich 
hinaus"], i.e. "B削1g-ahead-ofitse!f.(BT, p. 236) Being-ahead－。ι1日elfis a projecting towards 
being itself. Here is a link between possibility and仕・eedom.Dasein's being-in-the world is 
ahead-ofit>e!fbeing-alrea.ιin－作che－叩orld）出 Being-a/orψide.This問thetconspicuous exp町田ion
reflects Heidegger’s ms1srent avoidance of a certam traditional understandmg of be mg m telation to 
the three d1mens10ns of p出t,present, and futute, as understood m modern日rms.Po拙 b1hty
[Moglichkeit] is characterised by freedom (BT. p. 237). Freedom grounds，出 inthe smoking 
example, the conditions in which I can be this or that, authentic or inauthentic 5 In Being and 
Time, Freedom is neither an ideal to achieve nor the ground for ethical decision-making. Freedom 
as a phenomenon is speci自callydescribed旧日rmsof possibility, which reveals the mode of Dasein 
田 beingahead of itself, i.e. projecting.6 
Possibility is the way to unders阻ndthe present. Heidegger emphasise that the ‘p問sentC四 be
revealed田 future,which belongs to po田ibility’（modi自edfrom Kisiel, 2005. p. 197).7 In this, 
possibility does not 児島rto some static future moment on a line stretching from the pr田em.
Po阻bt!ityindic紅白aprojecting towards my own bemg, such that I relate to that being through 
understanding. Through this projecting, through freedom田 po日ibility,we unders田ndthe world 
This is the nature of our being-in戸the-world.
Beゐreproceeding to the final section of this paper, I would like to acknowledge a possible 
complication in the argument, though space prevents ful development of this. It is true that a仁
田rtainpoint「－forexample, Bies阻（2012)ennches his account with reference to Zygmunt 
Bauman, and by implication to Emmanuel Levinas, and the notion that human being is always 
structured by a relation to‘出eOther'. For Levinas, human being is to be understood in terms of 
the approach of the Othe「－thatis，ぬroughbeing addressed In this r田pect,the relation to the 
Other must be understood田 priorto the relanon to other objects m the world Heidegger's 
bemg-in-the-world seems in this respect not to recognise sufficiently the priority of the human 
Other over the otherness of objects, or of those alongside whom I happen to stand. The concept of 
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being-with (Mit-sein), which subs回ntiatesfor Heidegger the existence of the other, is sa口risedby 
Levinas as a relation of‘marching together’Heidegger's being with implies a relation where one is 
related to the other through a common purpose or shared charactemncs. For Levinas, by contrast, 
being-w1th is facmg no-where else than towards the Other: It IS to be addressed by the Other, 
always already addressed. 
Likewise, ethics, beゐreontology, is epitomised by the face, which Levinas describ自由 a
‘conctete abstraction' It is out of this that the here and now isconstituted. The face indicates that I 
am judged, I am under judgment, now and always. Every day is judgement day, which is not an 
event to be identified on some future calendar judgment day is now. And this diachronously cuts 
aero田 thechronology of my being. In thi路町spectit might be claimed that, m contrast to 
Heidegger’s ontology, the significance of the present must be charactensed first and foremost in 
terms of ethical judgemen「－hence,Levinas's 'ethics before ontology’Yet this is emph叩callynot 
to say that his p閃sentimplies a no任問mporality,as if we could step outs1de time. It rs essentially 
tempo悶iin terms of this cuttmg across of chronolog1cal nme, so that no present moment is 
exempt from the time of judgement. 
This criticism of Heidegger’s conception of otherness is in no way a denial of projection. It rs 
rather its more rigorous specific沼ion,the urgent reminder that our projectmg should not be 
reduced to some kind of unproblematic, common, unidirectional purposiven口sIn other words, 
acknowledgement of the address that com田丘omthe Other，出roughwhich one is always already 
C部℃ mresponsib1lny, does not問movethe argument I am advancmg regarding temporality and 
freedom田 po日ib1lity.Rather it reaffirms and remforces the cnt1que of atemporality. 
4. EDUCATION AS PROJECT 
The notion of non-temporality perhaps is a rhetorical expression which I have not developed 
enough of a sense of English to enjoy However, the negative prefix certainly limits other 
poss1bil1t1es of understandmg temporality in education and freedom. The final task of the paper rs 
to show the posmve relanon berween freedom and education in the light of日mpo四lity
The Manifoto is in part a r白ponseto Jacques Ranciere’s crinque of a日mpo悶iunderstanding 
of inequality, an unders四ndingoriented towards overcoming inequality in the fu山町.Considermg 
the qu回目onof equality in education, the authors suggest a non-temporal alternative, along the 
lines of the principle that‘equality [what is not] co-exists with iれequality[what is]' (Bi口ta,2012, p 
8) Non-temporahty, thus, 1s ao intellectual device that can be used to 'stage’dissensu「－figuted
here as the日ns10nbetween what 1s and what is not. Seen w1th111 this structure, mo問印nvent10nal
criticism regarding overzealousness in education about a predetermmed future turns out not to be a 
sufficient conditionゐrthe negation of temporality For what is negated there, strictly speaking, is 
‘predetermmed time' Besides, the authors take the view that education, like freedom, is 
fundamen四lyhistorical: 
It 1s, therefore, the place where freedom appears To stay in the tension berweenιwhat 
IS’and 'what 1s not' thus means to take history seriously and to take education国
fundamentally historical-that is, open to events, to the new and the unforeseen rather 
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than剖 anendless repetition of what already is or as a march towards a predetermined 
future that may never arive.仏1.p. 541) 
Such hisron口tyand freedom rs inherently temporal. So the qu田tionwe must be concerned 
with is how temporality is to be unde四rood.Previously I considered the point that projecting or 
being ahead of on田elfis the nature of freedom as possibility. Projecting mdicates that aspect of our 
being through which we understand the world. 'As projecting,' Heidegger claims，‘understanding is 
the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as p田sibilities'(BT, p. 185) Thus, 
projecting rs not a programmatic lmkage叩 agiven task or剖m,equality or whatever rt may be, but 
a basic mode of undemanding as my being this and that. Possibility is shown through our 
projecting in the world 
Projecting as inherent in education perhaps explains the reason th紅白etraditional 
understanding of time is tred prog四mmaticallyto the future. Let us then think of education部 a
project in this sense, not as a programme or plan. The prog四mmeconnot田 asense of planning or 
proclamation (rooted in the Latin, programma) or the written public notice (in Greek, also, 
pr得ramma).8Education has a cerram busine田 withpublic space, but what the programme tends 
to emphasise is the fixed, wnrten plan. We must flt m to the programme. The outcome of the 
programme is also expected at the end of the p阻ctice.Furthermore, the idea of the progr阻 1me
naturally separates the designer and the user of the programme A programmer usually refers to a 
programme designer The prog四mmercan spend rime studying the prospective user in order to 
develop a better programme, e g by designing a user－仕iendlyprogramme The designing proc田sis 
inevi回blyseparated from actual usage of the programme Be五orereleasmg the programme the 
designer wrl set up beta 国防sothat again a time-gap between development and usage is created. 
And this, as the Manifesto also implies, is embedded in the linear conception of time in education. 
The project, by contrast，問回insthe conno回目onof throwing （イect)forward (pro-), as is crucial 
for the Heideggerian notion of unders回nding.Projecring pr回e何回 itssense of becoming as 
unders阻nding,an understanding that never setles down and that remains the business of the 
'pr句ecror',the one projecting 9 In projecting, time appears to be e回目ltialyfururalw Heidegger 
writesιTo be futural [zukiinjiig-sem] m田町田be、mporal”［＂zeirlich”ser心.Here, temporal does 
not m四 n“intime’but time itself' (CT. 49) In this, for Heidegger 'the basic phenomenon of time 
is the future.’（Dahlstrom, 2005, p. 160) Po田ibilityis being, pr.りectingas freedom. In other words, 
自reedom as possibility is ascribed to one’s understanding relationship to futural time 
Being-ahead占。ιmyselfis a pr句ecringtowards the finirude of my being. From the point of finitude, 
being司in-the-worldas possibility becomes meaning白l:<[it］田nthus come to have a clear vision', 
Heidegger writes，百orthe accidents of the Situation that has been disclosed.’（BT, p. 436) The 
choice that is linked ro freedom in Heidegger does not arise in con仕・ontingdilemmas or in 
plumpmgゐrthrs or that, but appears within my unde回目ndingof my being as being-in-the-world, 
and as we have seen thrs unders阻ndingis opened up only m relation to possibility. 1 
Through the id四 ofprojection (Entwurfi in this r田pe口 isl旧 kedto the nature ofほnt町in
Klaus Mollenhauer (2005). Mollenhauer claims identity only exists as fiction (Frktion) not as 
experience of concrete even日 Andhe emphasises such fiction is necessary for education For this 
ficnon, as Mollenhauer claims，問presentsnot a s田口cobject so called identity itself but only my 
relation to the idea of identity which is open to the future in projecting. Likewise, in unders阻nding
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of the identity, the日mporalnature of education is the co陀 of山 p悶cttces.In this respe口，
projecting is nor to be reduced to the arm of education m an unattamable foture, for our 
engagement 11 and目cognitionof the world always inherently involve< projecting 
At this point, my unde四回ndmgof mu （無 nothmgness)is related to the Heideggerian sense of 
freedom as possibility, pr句ecting,becoming The Chinese character, mu (nothingness) is literally 
consisted of fire and bush In日rmsof the composition, it can be interpreted the forest on the fire, 
or theゐ問stwith no trees （主張ー林＋火（川、）＝無）.Even so, the Chinese charac問問It(1照） displays not 
the outcome of the burn mg but the becoming of the burning, something in the middle of burning. 
In etymological sense, the meaning of mu represen白血eid四 ofthe dynamic of burning, which I 
interpret I日目asbecoming. 
Emptiness is not a concrete being somewhere in the world which consis臼 ofspace and time, 
but a contemplation or projection toward the idea of emptmess Thrs is not to reject the possibility 
of emptme日 butto emphasise the core of the cnnremplation of emptin田sis on becoming, 
poss1b11ity, that I claim, finite human仕・eedom.Heidegger in his lecture, in this respect, on 
Schellings附 ・atiseon the Essence ofHumanfi'eedom (1985, p. 123) specifically deals with the idea of 
becoming and freedom 12 
In thrs light, the idea of nothingness rs nothing other than the moment of becoming. 
Nothingness as becommg nothmg rs not separated from the one who co町empl紅白 nothingin 
terms of projection. In thisゐrmula,one may claim I am nothmgness. Thisぉtheway that I 
unde回目ndthe idea of仕eedomin terms of possibility and becoming with the relation with mu 
Such contemplation is e回目立ialytaken part with temporality in terms of finite human being. 
In this r回pect,one may claim that the Manifesto itself suggests an idea of仕eedomas a project of 
education The attempt to陀ーゐcuson freedom in education should be appre口ated，出oughI think 
that the authors' attempt to S日poutside time, to be a temporal, doe., not mal<e sense. My aim in 
the paper has been to I田町irmthe onrologrcal relationship between freedom and time, which 
reveals the nature of education as project. Education田 projectおinconceivablewithout time 
Hence, freedom is discussed in this paper not as an ideal but a ground for education 13 
NOTES 
I y,;, papcc uses the abbccv;adons as drn5' M -B;回目， G.and Safstim, C八（2011)“AMan;fesro for 
Educadon", Poliq Fuwes in Education 9 (5), p. 540-547; BT -Hdde路er,M. (1962) Being andηme, 
translated by Macquarrk, J.and乳ob;nson,E. (New York, Harper); CT -Hddcggec, M. (2011）刀oeCo町伊tof
Time, ttansbred by Fadn, I. (London, Condnuum). 
2. http://www.w;bhow.com/Wr;rc a-Mao;fcsto (rctdcvcd 20 Feb 20日）
3. As Bksra once cons;dcrιd clsewhccc (2010) it ;, the tad;t;on凡lthought s;nc Immanuel Kant. In fact, much 
Hterature has been devoted to cddds;ng the problem of the tempo阻lundmtand;ng of freedom and al the;e 
k;nds of educadonal ;deos that a陀 placed;n the end of educadon. Aud the cdt旧smof the author< ;, of the 
Hn回ror modern conccpt;on of dme wh;cl, hぉdevelopedthroughout trad;donal cdncadon. 
4. In fact, Bks日 makesclear that non tempo悶i;rydocs not reject日mpocaHtyoc h;sror;dry ;n ed山ご叩on'
‘Th;s, as we E庁 toargue, ;, not to rake h;srory out of cducat;on, but rather四回keh;srmy scdously，回
bcHevc that l羽田町田nbe made, because h;srory ;, not the unfold;ng of a programme, but an ;mperfect 
sequence of event>. ’（B;esra, 2012, p. 2) Also by cla;m;ng to＇回ketime our of education’Bk＇回 suggests
th;nking and ddng cducadon ours;de of the confine' of acer四日1日mporaHry.Th;s paper develops other 
poss;b;Htks of undersrand;ng of日mporaHry;n educat;on ;n whkh freedom plays a key role. 
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5 Because we exist田 beingthis and出at,Heidegger explains we exist in anxiety. Authent旧 tyand inauthentiαty 
do not indicate truth and fulsity, respectively It is a matter of po5'ibility.“But to the口tentthat this Being 
回wardsits pntentialiry-for-Being is itself characterized by freedom, Dasein can cnmpnrt inelf towatds its 
po剖bili旧国，evenunwillingly; it can be inauthentically; and白cticalyit is inaurhenrically, proximally andゐrthe 
most part.”（BT, p. 237) Such possibility thus is not about one’s own pure日pacityto control whether or not 
one is authe 1tic 
6. I have not at悶 nptedto develop the M田 offreedom in relatin to moluteness and authenticity. This is 
prnly because of limits of space but also because I wanted nor to implicarc Heidegger in an 
anthropological and ethical interpre回tion.To put rhis differently, the emphasis of丘町domin this paper is 
not to do with matters of choice but with the nature of possibility in projecting Freedom is grasped in this 
paper as a possibility of being and time. In education, this freedom cannot be an ideal of its practice for it 
is its ground, as a project which日nbe this and that. 
7. The ongmal exp町田ionof Kisiel is as follows: In a summary of the prepositional nexus of Being and Time, 
Heidegger had already emphasized that the relations of the in-order-to can be understood only“if the 
Dasein unders回ndssomething of the nature of the for theーsake-oιitself'.An in-order-to (present) can be 
revealed only insofat as theらr-the－日ke-of(future) that belongs to a potentiality-for-being is undcmood. 
(Kisiel, 2005, p. 197) 
8. http：／八vwwe守monlinecom/index.php?allowed_in_frame=O&seatch=programme&searchmode=none 
(remeved 20 April 2013) 
9 To make more sense on die m白血ngof project, let’s m噌neone virual四 e.A shooting伊mecompetition is 
announced. It is a回 mbased match叩dI am a member of a shooting I剖 n.The t曲 ndecides to sign up for die 
match. The t閣 nneeds trained. Al t凹ningαrcumsranc田町setup: a coachゐr出ez叩九叩da training programme, 
guns for sure, and出efield. We set up a schedule for die t剛川島明日vea trial. We find something wrong, so what 
we印nry is：品叩gc出eguns, ch叩getoa di能rentprogramme, and gcr another advice from the coach etc. We 
prep包C出eracac and strategy: arrange出eorder of shc otcrs fot tl1e match 
10 Projecting do田 notsepara阻止parricipatorfrom出ebderιIn project，出eremay be some roles like leader or so, but 
al 町 involv吋ma cert町田kAnd becauεe it is proドα，when出cgi"n四 k岱over,it is nor gt四国間dto work for 
otl1er悶 moc even for出every same in the fo凹陀Themembers of the 聞 nmay田町on出c四 nas usual but not 
quite m出csome way出at出可 developedin the p町ecιA丘町出cmatch，出eordinary life go凶 on.Likewise, 
吋u田口onis P叫ectin a sense w出血epositi刊 notionof time in pro炉cting,which is temporal (no lin田r,but 
accidental and spontaneous) and 1s made thr凹 gh出ep副旧paror.As daimed above, besides, projec山gis not 
separ司tedfrom出ematter of being herιSince by undersranding, we are being m出cworld. In terms of projectin島
edu回目on1s intensively and inherently四国miscof freedom as posibility. In c ther words, the na凹reof edu田tionis 
民mainedin time in the name of丘町dom.
11 F山 talhere, in the relation with frεedom in flnitude, con悶 sof hi凹 oriα可ofbeing－昨the-world：ιOnly
刷出Zりwhich,in的 Being,is esm山a/JウJ号tturalso that it is j知 fa1its death and can let附elfbe thrown 
back叩開店j告ctical功。r”内ysha附ringit•e/f against d，田th吋hatis to say, only仰 enβvwhich，尉斤<tural,is 
equ 
take over出 0削品mwnnessand be in the moment ~グ visionJらF 'j" 棚 e'.0ゆauthentictempora均
wh"h is at the same time finite, makes possible son出・hinglike j告re-thatis to say，山4ιhentichistoric,1！.叩’（BT,p. 
43η 
12. T1is is related to Biesta's adap阻tionof Levinas on choice and r田ponsibility.(Siesta, 2012, p. 9) The 
possible telation between the understanding of beingin-the旬、＂orldand subjectiflcation would require 
another paper. But primarily there seems to be a relation between them m日rmsof freedom. And the 
difference凶amatter of temporality. 
13. The indicated lecture was held in 1936 which is tentatively regatded before Heidegger’s Turning or earlier 
wotks. For the intensive discussion on the idea of nothingness and becoming in Heidegger’s later works, P. 
Standish (2012), Pure Expenence and Transcendence Down, in: Naoko, S, S回ndish,P (eds.) 
Education and the KyMo School of Philosop砂（London:Springer), pp. 19 26. 
14. This paper w"' presented at The 6th International CoJloquium between the Institute of Education, 
University of London, and the Graduate School ofEducorion, Kyoto University in 2013. The version of 
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rhe reχE published here has been shaped by rhe discussion ar rhe colloquium, which was focused on the 
idea of nothingnm in Heidegger and the Kyoto School. The unders阻ndingof nothingness th町 Io日fer
here is adapted from Heidegger with reference co an analysis of the Chinese character, mu. In 2014 a more 
developed version of出eoriginal argument was published tn 出cj,urnal 'f Phiksop再yof Education (2014, 
48 (3), pp. 385-399). 
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